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Abstract  
Using a simple search model, with urn-ball derived 
matching function, this paper investigates the effect of 
firm owner’s and coworkers’ nativity on hiring patterns 
and wages. In the model, social networks reduce search 
frictions and wages are derived endogenously as a 
function of the efficiency of the social ties of current 
employees. As a result, individuals with more efficient 
connections tend to receive higher wages and lower 
unemployment rate. However, because this efficiency 
depends on matching with same-type owners and 
coworkers, there is also a differential effect among 
workers’ wages in the same firm. This analysis 
highlights the potential importance of social connections 
and social capital for understanding employment 
opportunities and wage differentials between these 
groups. 
 
Keywords: immigration; search models; social networks; 
wage differential; hiring process. 
1. Introduction 
Previous work has studied the effects of networks in the 
labor market to explain labor market inequalities as a 
function of differential social capital (social resources, 
network structures, network resources).  Minority 
individuals are generally connected to other minority-
group workers who can only provide them with limited 
opportunities to change their employment outcomes.    In 
this context, personal networks are then considered an 
additional determinant of inequality [1].  For instance, 
Hispanics and blacks are disadvantaged because they are 
likely to match with same-kind job contacts, and end up 
working in lower wage workplaces where other 
Hispanics and blacks work (see [2]). 
This paper intends to model the interconnection 
between owner's and coworkers' nativity and workers' 
hiring patterns and wages. We use a simple search model 
where social networks reduce search frictions to develop 
the theoretical implications of social ties between owners 
and workers for individual labor outcomes. In the model, 
wages are derived endogenously as a function of the 
efficiency of the social ties of current employees. Firms 
can fill their vacancies either by posting their offers or by 
using their current workers' connections. However, 
employers may use this mechanism differently for 
different worker types, depending on their ability to take 
advantage of their workers' connections.  Given their 
cultural, linguistic, and social backgrounds, immigrant 
employers have an advantage, compared to natives, in 
exploiting their immigrant workers' social connections. 
As a result, individuals with better connections -a 
combination of owner type and coworkers type- tend to 
have higher wages. Two forces drive that result.  First, 
current workers provide a costless recruitment 
mechanism to the firm. Second, workers will produce 
more new hires in the future and for those unemployed, a 
better social connection would result in more job offers. 
The rest of the paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 
provides a background on the discussion on the use of 
networks in the labor market, particularly by minority 
groups; Section 3 provides reasoning behind the 
assumptions in the model; Section 4 presents the model; 
and Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
2. Background  
2.1. On the Effect of Firm Owners and 
Coworkers 
Both employers and employees may make use of their 
contacts to find each other.  On the job seeker side, for 
instance, three direct beneficial effects can be related to 
the use of contacts. First, contacts can provide job 
opportunities that may not be widely known by the 
public.  Also, contacts can increase the chances of 
getting a particular job by being a referred candidate. 
Third, contacts may offer additional information about 
the job environment (i.e. internal structure and boss-
employee relation).1   
The potential benefits of the use of this mechanism by 
employers are also documented. The personnel literature 
has discussed the employers hiring procedures, with 
special attention to certain informal methods of 
recruitment, such as those which rely on current 
employees for dissemination of information (see [5] and 
[6]). Also the role of employee referrals in the 
understanding of ethnic divisions of labor and allocation 
of jobs has been considered (see [2]).  
  Current workers may increase the number of 
applicants by spreading the words about a new opening. 
This process is generally costless for the firm.  
                                                           
1 See [3] and [4]), among others. 
2 
 
Furthermore, in the labor market generally employers 
have imperfect information about the candidate 
unobserved ability.   To correct for this, firms could use 
employee referrals as a useful screening device. Personal 
contacts might transmit information about productivity 
of applicants that otherwise would be difficult to obtain 
from a simple evaluation of the candidate Current 
workers give information for future candidates, because 
workers tend to refer individuals with similar 
characteristics to themselves ([6] called 'inbreeding 
bias']), or tend to refer high-qualified candidates given 
that their reputation would depend on this new 
candidates performances. Therefore, current workers' 
information may reduce uncertainty about future 
workers' productivity.   
  Additionally, employers can obtain more information 
about candidate qualities such as work ethic and 
leadership, providing a higher chance of a 'better match'.  
Finally, employers can also benefit from the potential 
cooperation among coworkers in the workplace.  On-the-
job training can be provided by older employees at zero 
cost for the firm, generating a faster assimilation for new 
comers. 
On wage effects, previous research has suggested that 
much of the unexplained variation in wages among 
employees is linked to characteristics of their firms, such 
as size and industry.2 Not only individual characteristics 
explain wage differentials between immigrants and 
natives, but potentially so do other characteristics, such 
as the birthplace or ethnicity of employers and 
coworkers.   
2.2. Social Networks, Ethnic/Racial Groups and 
Immigrant Segregation 
Empirical literature has also discussed the racial and 
ethnic differences in informal job matching (see [2] and 
[5]).  These differences arise because informal channels 
permit race and other characteristics in the network to 
play a more prominent role in the hiring process than it 
does when formal mechanisms are used.  As noted by 
[2], one of the puzzles during 1980s and 1990s was the 
worsening of less educated blacks in the labor markets 
while the same markets were absorbing thousands of 
new immigrant workers.  Surprisingly, these new 
workers had, on average, similar characteristics to 
blacks: low formal education and high geographic 
segregation.  So the question of job distribution became 
to be a first order issue, especially in the topics of 
immigration and immigrant assimilation.  According to 
                                                           
2 See [7]-[9]. 
[10], the answer for this puzzle has been focused in the 
use of social networks by different groups for finding 
employment.   
Meanwhile the role of prospective employers in the 
use of these mechanisms has been ignored. The 
differential use of job referral by the employers is also 
relevant when we examine who is hired and how the 
benefits are distributed in the firm. For instance, 
immigrants will be hired most likely by immigrant firms 
with high share of immigrant workers than by native 
firms with high share of immigrant workers.  This 
tendency promotes the creation of what [1] called 
immigrant economies. 
3. Modeling the Importance of Social 
Networks and Labor Outcomes   
[5] is the first theoretical discussion of firms' hiring 
procedures. However, no implications for wages were 
analyzed.  The hypothesis is that networks may reduce 
costs and the uncertainty about workers' productivity. 
Since screening workers, negotiating wages, supervising, 
and enforcing contracts are all part of the administrative 
costs of a firm, firm owners may improve efficiency by 
using network connections available to workers with 
similar social backgrounds.  We can think then that 
information networks may work better within groups 
(ethnic/race of employers and employees) than between 
them.  
A second group of studies consider job information 
networks as exogenous and investigate the impact of 
networks on wages (see [6]). Networks solve the 
informational problem that employers face when they 
cannot observe the underlying ability of potential 
workers. In these models, the equilibrium wage 
distribution increases with the probability that an offer 
comes from a contact.  These works further evaluate the 
link between wages and the strength of social ties (strong 
versus weak).  Their models assume that firms post 
wages above or below the market wage based on the 
distribution of skill across individuals, and then workers 
decide whether to accept the offer or do otherwise. 
Because there is not a reservation wage developed in the 
model, individuals who reject offers or do not receive 
any offer must find employment in the anonymous 
market, so there is not employment differential across 
worker types.   
More recent studies have explicitly modeled the 
structure of networks to analyze the effect of network 
dynamics on wages and unemployment (see [11] and 
[12]). In these models, the topology of the social ties is 
defined and built with detail and networks also work as 
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instruments to dissipate information imperfections. 
Workers face a cost of obtaining information on 
vacancies, or need to join networks that provide them 
with the best information. However, these models only 
focus on the supply side of the market; the role of firms 
or any type of negotiation are ignored. They treat labor 
markets as a black box. Therefore, the origin of the 
vacancy and the participation of firms in the job search 
are ignored. 
4. A Simple Search Model 
We consider a model similar to [5] where firms choose 
hiring procedures and workers search for jobs, and, then, 
include the importance of social contacts by assuming 
that firms take into account their current workers' social 
connections in their decision process.  We include 
different types of firms and multiple networks. Firms can 
choose to fill their vacancies either by posting offers or 
by using their current workers' connections -a costless 
process-, considering the capacity of their employees to 
find candidates for the position.  
There are two types of firms ( o ) denoted as native-
owned ( n ) and immigrant-owned ( f ), and two types of 
workers ( i ) denote as native ( n ) and immigrant ( f ).  
The number of each type of worker is exogenously given 
by iL , and the number of type i  workers among the 
unemployed is iu .   
Workers and firms are risk neutral, live infinitely and 
have a common discount rate r . There is free-entry, and 
o  represents the number of type o  firms in steady 
state.  Only unmatched workers engage in search.  
Unemployed workers receive a value of leisure b , and 
workers are separated from jobs at the exogenous rate s .  
Jobs are vacant or occupied. 
4.1. The Matching Function 
Like [13], the matching function is derived from an urn-
ball process.3 This process provides a microfoundation 
                                                           
3 In the typical urn-ball process, there are U unemployed workers and V 
vacancies.  Each unemployed worker submits an application.  These 
applications are randomly distributed across the V vacancies with the 
restriction that any particular worker send at most one application to 
any particular vacancy.  Each vacancy then chooses one application at 
random and offers that applicant a job.  A worker may get more than 
one offer.  In that case, the worker accepts one of the offers at random. 
Urn-ball process introduces a new coordination problem, because there 
could be multiple applications of job seekers but only one firm will hire 
the individual.   
for the matching process and considers the coordination 
failure that arises from congestion externalities.4   
Then, as in [6] we include workers in the search 
process and the idea of job referral as a screening device. 
So, the efficiency of the social networks is also a 
function of the capacity of current workers to replicate 
themselves through the new candidate ('inbreeding bias'), 
together with employers’ capacity of obtaining the best 
information from the worker about the new comer. 
Each existing worker generates applicants for the 
employer at an exogenous rate
io , which depends on 
worker ( i ) and employer ( o ) types. This factor is 
common to all firms with type o  and worker i . Here, 
io  plays the role of the network efficiency variable 
considered in [13].  Network efficiency depends on the 
number of workers of type i  in the firm and their social 
ties with same-type unemployed workers in steady state, 
and of the employer o 's ability to use his employees' 
(type i ) connections.  
Unemployed workers receive offers from two sources: 
from posted vacancies and from similar-type current 
workers in the firm. 1/ u  is the chance that any 
unemployed worker receives an offer from a posted 
vacancy and 1/ iu  is a type-i unemployed worker's 
probability of receiving an offer from social ties to a 
particular existing worker at the firm.  Given the 
randomness of vacancies offered to unemployed 
workers, the probability that no firms' offers reach an 
unemployed worker of type i is given by  
,
(1 1 / ) (1 1 / )o io i
o
v L
i
o n f
u u


  . 
We assume that the levels of vacancies and 
unemployment are very high, which result in a constant 
ratio (market tightness). Therefore, the urn-ball matching 
function exhibits constant returns to scale. 
With this in mind, we can then derive the probability 
that an unemployed worker from group i receives at least 
one offer.  
 
,
1 (1 1/ ) (1 1/ )o io io
o
v L
i i
o n f
C u u


       (1) 
where iC  represents the probability that an 
unemployed worker receives at least one job offer.  This 
distribution can be approximated by a Poisson 
                                                           
4 This failure arises when workers apply to some vacancies without 
knowing where other workers applied, so that as a result there are 
multiple applications to some vacancies and zero to others. Therefore, 
the group of vacancies without applicants remains unfilled. For more 
detail refer to [14]. Here the case is reversed. Unemployed workers are 
considered the urns and job offers the balls. These workers received 
multiple offers depending on the conditions in the model. 
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distribution. 
 1 exp( )i iC             (2) 
where  
 
i o io io
o o
i
i
p v L
u




 
   ,   (3) 
and 
i
i
u
p
u
               (4) 
 The probability that an offer is matched to an 
unemployed worker of type i is given by the matching 
function 
1
( )i i i
i o io io
o o
m u C
p v L



 
 .  (5) 
This function exhibits constant returns to scale. An 
increase of 
io  will translate into an increase in the 
number of offers to a particular worker in group i.  We 
can rewrite Equation (5) as  
 
1
( ) (1 exp( ))i i
i
m  

    ,      (6) 
where ( )im   is the expected number of workers 
hired of type i. It can be shown that ( ) / 0i im     . 
 
2
( ) ( ) (1 ( ))i i i i
i i
m exp exp   
 
   


  (7) 
which is negative as long as 
  1 ( ) ( )iexp exp      .  
When 0x  , then ( ) (1 ( )) 0xexp x exp x     .  
The derivative of this function is negative with respect to 
x  for 0x   (i.e. the tighter the market, the harder for 
firms to find a worker). 
Additionally, ( )i im   represents the exit rate from 
unemployment for an individual i. The total number of 
matches is the sum of the contact rates within each social 
group.  
 ( ) ( )i o io io i
o i
M p v L m        (8) 
4.2. Workers: Unemployed and Employed  
On the workers' side, we denote iU  as the present 
discounted utility of an unemployed worker and ioW  as 
the present discounted value of an employed worker 
holding a job, with iow  being the wage rate for worker 
type i in firm type o. 
 ( )( [ ])i i i io irU b m E W U          (9) 
 rW = w +s(U -W )io io i io           (10) 
Workers receive offers from formal and informal 
channels, but only accept one offer. Therefore, an 
increment in the probability of finding a candidate 
through current workers increases the number of offers 
received by unemployed workers through informal 
channels. 
4.3. Firms: Vacancy and Filled-Job Value 
To simplify the model, an employee of a given group 
transfers job offers only to unemployed workers 
belonging to the same group. If he doesn't find an 
unemployed worker from his group, the job offer is lost. 
All types of employed workers produce y .    
In addition to relying on coworker referrals, firms can 
advertise a job vacancy at a cost c . These posted offers 
are sent randomly to u  unemployed workers. i  
represents market tightness for workers of group i. ov  is 
the number of vacancies posted by firm of type o .  
Firms choose ov  taking into account that employees 
also produce applicants. Therefore, employers face the 
following profit maximization problem: 
0
( ) ( ) ( )
vo
o io io io io o io
V L Max y L w L cv rV L

      
 s.t ( ) ( )o io io o i o
i
L L v m sL              
o io
i
L L              (11) 
The firm is interested in ioL  given io . ( )ioV L is the 
firm expected profit. 
Solving the Bellman Equation and using Kuhn-Tucker 
conditions we obtain: 
 
(.)
0
( )
 
( )
io
o
i io i
c y w
v
m r s m  

 



   
 (12) 
 
(.)
0
( )
 
( )
io
o
i io i
c y w
v
m r s m  

 



 
 (13) 
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Firms will post a vacancy if and only if the cost of 
posting the vacancy is equal to the value of filling the 
vacancy. If 
ov  different to zero, in each period a firm o 
would choose the number of advertised vacancies, so it 
controls the increment of its total number of employees. 
In this way, the firm indirectly influences the number of 
applicants the social network will produce. Therefore, 
social connections may be used by the firms to find new 
workers in a costless way and as a mechanism for 
screening workers. 
Wages are a result of bargaining between workers and 
employers. With this we endogenize labor market 
outcomes (wages and vacancies) but assume an 
exogenous job information network.5   
Wages are subject to a bargaining process. The surplus 
of each match is shared according to the Nash solution of 
the bargaining problem, with [0,1]   representing the 
bargaining weight of firms. 
 (1 )( )io io iJ W U         (14) 
where oJ  is the expected value of a filled job with a 
worker type i for a firm o. An individual will accept an 
offer if it is above the bargained wage. Using Equations 
(9)-(11) and Equation (14) we derive the wage implied 
by Nash bargaining. 
 
 
 
 
( )
(1 )
io
io
i
r s
w b y b
r s

  

  
  
   

 
 (15) 
where   ( )i im  .   
The arrival rate of job offers from a firm o to an 
unemployed worker of type i is directly proportional to 
the number of people in the network (group i) who are 
employed in firm o. An interpretation for io  is that it 
represents the capacity of workers and employers to take 
advantage of the groups' social connections. We could 
think io  consists of two exogenous components   
 ( , )oio if   .       (16) 
where i  is the set of connections that current workers 
of type i have, and o  represents the employer's ability 
to take advantage of his current employees' social ties..  
Proposition 1: In partial equilibrium, taking i  as 
given, and for a given y, c, b, and s, wages are an 
                                                           
5 Other models fully describe the topology of the networks. However, 
in the framework of this paper, trying to endogenize networks would 
make it impossible to find a closed form solution. The simplicity of the 
model presented here allows us to draw strong implications without 
losing the relevant characteristics of the process. 
increasing function of the efficiency of the social 
network 
io  . A higher network efficiency induces a 
higher job matching rate for the firm with no additional 
cost. 
Proof: Using Equation (15) we compute the derivative 
of wages with respect to social network efficiency: 
 
 
2
(1 ) ( )( )
0
( ) (1 ) ( )
io i
io i i io i
w m y b
r s m m
  
     
  
 
    
.  (17) 
The increase on the efficiency of networks for a 
worker type i in a firm o generates a higher number of 
expected matches for workers of type i, given them a 
better bargaining position in the firm.  Therefore, we 
would expect the probability of hiring an immigrant 
worker to be higher the larger the amount of immigrant 
workers already employed by a firm. We could call this 
the 'coworker effect'.  Additionally, when group i has 
more efficient social ties, and the owner is also more 
efficient in taking advantage of these social ties to find 
new workers, the use of current employees' connections 
to find candidates becomes less costly.  Workers of type i 
would provide more candidates to the firm, therefore, the 
probability of this group being hired by the firm will be 
higher than otherwise, and the wage of those particular 
candidates would be higher compared to those with less 
efficient social networks in the firm.   
There are two forces generated by any increment in 
io .  On one side, it increases the job offers using 
informal channels, more candidates are searched by 
owners using current workers. On the other side, it 
decreases the number of vacancies advertised because 
firms find more costly to post a vacancy compared to 
using informal channels.  This substitution effect 
guarantees the uniqueness of the equilibrium. 
Because of lack of familiarity with their employees’ 
cultural background, language, and social patterns, 
owners may not necessarily be able to exploit their 
employers’ social ties. Within a firm, workers of 
different groups are paid differently because their social 
ties differ in their level of efficiency. That is, foreign-
born and native workers receive different wages when 
working for an immigrant firm because links between 
immigrant employers and immigrant workers result in 
more worker referrals. Additionally, workers with higher 
offer arrival rates earn more in equilibrium. For instance, 
if we assume a distribution of network efficiency as 
follows: nn ff fn nf      , there would be a 
distribution of wages in which natives are paid higher 
wages when working for native firms, but are paid lower 
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when they work for immigrant-owned businesses. 
Similarly, immigrants are paid better when working for 
immigrant employers, but still obtaining lower wages 
overall in the market.  
Proposition 2: In equilibrium, labor market tightness 
adjusts so that the expected cost of an advertised vacancy 
equals the expected profit of a filled position.   
Proof: Using results from the firm's problem, Equation 
(11), with 0ov  , and wage bargaining results from 
Equation (15), we obtain: 
 
(1 )
( ) ( ) (1 ) ( )i i i io i
c y b
m r s m m

     
 

   
           
 (18) 
The solution is defined only when the right hand side 
of Equation (18) is positive, that is, when the marginal 
value of a filled position is positive.  This holds provided 
that 
( ) (1 ) ( ) 0i i io ir s m m         . 
 Assuming
i , such that : 
( ) (1 ) ( ) 0i i io ir s m m         ,  
then for values of [ , ]i i    , the expression is 
increasing in i  , so that the marginal value of a filled 
vacancy is decreasing with respect to i  , while the cost 
of a filling vacancy increases with higher values of i  . 
Unemployment rate in equilibrium is obtained by 
equating the flow out of employment to the flow into the 
unemployment for each type i and is a function of the 
market tightness and the exit rate. 
 
( )
i
i i
s
u
s m 


           (19) 
Recall that ( )i im  is the unemployment exit rate.  
Using Equation (19), as io  increases, the equilibrium 
exit rate ( )i im   increases, reducing iu . 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Using a simple matching framework, this paper explores 
the potential mechanisms explaining the interconnection 
between owner's and coworkers' nativity and workers' 
hiring patterns and wage.  
The model has implications on the effect of social 
interactions on market wages. Among subgroups with 
the same y, h, s, firm-group combinations with higher 
io  will have higher wages and a lower unemployment 
rate.   
There would be a distribution of wages in which 
workers are paid higher when working for same-type 
owners. Within a firm, workers of different groups are 
paid differently because their social ties differ in their 
level of efficiency. That is, foreign-born and native 
workers receive different wages when working for an 
immigrant firm because links between immigrant 
employers and immigrant workers result in more worker 
referrals. Additionally, workers with higher offer arrival 
rates earn more in equilibrium.  
Even an immigrant firm with a low level of skilled 
workers could be able to generate a more efficient 
connection with its current workers if it can exploit the 
rate of worker replication. The better the employer can 
get information from its current employees, in this case 
the better immigrant firms obtain information from its 
current immigrant employees, the lower the uncertainty 
on the expected productivity, the lower the informational 
cost, and the lower the recruitment cost.  The informal 
mechanism would be relatively more efficient than the 
use of formal recruitment processes.     
In this framework, there are two effects generated by 
any increment of social connection's efficiency. On one 
side, it increases the job offers using informal channels; 
more candidates are found using current workers. On the 
other side, it decreases the number of vacancies 
advertised because firms find more costly to post a 
vacancy compared to use informal channels. 
In the model, wages are derived endogenously as a 
function of the efficiency of the social ties of current 
employees. There are two types of owners and workers: 
native and immigrant. Owners can choose to fill their 
vacancies either by posting offers or by using their 
current workers' connections. As a result, individuals 
with better connections have higher wages. Individual 
with more ties would find more candidates for the firm, 
but he would have more opportunities when he becomes 
unemployed. 
This analysis highlights the potential importance of 
social connections and social capital for understanding 
the disparity of employment opportunities and wage 
differentials between native and foreign born workers. 
Notice that we assume exogenous network efficiency. 
Trying to endogenize and define the topology of 
networks could make more challenging the solution of 
the model. 
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